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This paper examines how product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation 
affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under 
alternative modes of product market competition. It shows that, under pure profit 
maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree 
of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition. The possibility of emission 
tax rate to be positive and lower for more differentiated products, under quantity (price) 
competition, is higher (lower) in case of delegation than that in case of no delegation. It also 
shows that, under quantity (price) competition, the equilibrium emission tax rate, 
environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of delegation than that 
in case of no delegation. 
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 Delegation and Emission Tax in a Dierentiated Oligopoly
Rupayan Pal
1 Introduction
This paper analyses how optimal emission taxes are aected by the interaction between
strategic managerial delegation in rms and degree of product dierentiation under al-
ternative modes of product market competition, quantity and price. Whether optimal
emission tax rate is higher for more dierentiated products, and whether strategic man-
agerial delegation in rms calls for higher emission tax rate to control pollution are essential
concerns. Our framework allows us to address the question of how the mode of product
market competition aects these comparisons.
Emission tax is one of the most important policy measures to reduce environmental
damage due to pollution by rms. A large number of countries around the world extensively
use emission taxes (Fujiwara, 2009; Antelo and Loureiro, 2009; Norregaard and Reppelin-
Hill, 2000). Also, it is observed that most of these countries have relied substantially
more on tax/subsidy policies than on other instruments such as permits (Norregaard and
Reppelin-Hill, 2000).
Determination of optimal emission taxes on polluting rms in oligopolistic industries has
received considerable attention in recent years (see Fujiwara (2009), Antelo and Loureiro
(2009), Canton et al. (2008), Lahiri and Ono (2007), Yin (2003), Damania (2000),
Carlsson (2000), Ulph (1996), to name a few).1 However, most of the existing studies
consider that rms are pure prot maximizing agents and/or internal incentive structure(s)
of rms are exogenously determined. The issue of strategic managerial delegation in the
context of emission taxes has not received much attention in the literature so far. Moreover,
the existing literature does not address the issue of how the interactions among the degree
of product dierentiation, strategic managerial delegation and mode of product market
1See Requate (2005) for an excellent survey of related literature.
3competition aect emission taxes. This paper attempts to ll these gaps.
Oligopolistic polluting industries with dierentiated products are widely observed in
real life. In addition, strategic managerial delegation is a very common phenomenon in
rms that faces oligopolistic market structure. Starting with Vickers (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987), the literature on strategic managerial delegation
has been enriched by many studies, which examines implications of strategic delegation
to various issues 2. However, this stream of literature neglects the issue of environmental
policies and investment decision of rms to abate pollution.
We note that Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) examines the impact of strategic man-
agerial delegation on emission taxes considering homogeneous product Cournot duopoly. It
argues that a switch from pure prot maximization to strategic managerial delegation leads
to higher emission taxes and environmental damage. This paper diers from Barcena-Ruiz
and Garzon (2002) in two important aspects. First, this paper allows for product dierenti-
ation and examines the role of product dierentiation explicitly. Second, the framework of
this paper allows to examine how the interaction between strategic managerial delegation
and mode of product market competition aects the optimal emission tax rate. Therefore,
the analysis of this paper encompasses the analysis of Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) as
a special case. In an another paper that is closely related to the present analysis, Fujiwara
(2009) argues that the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is increasing in degree of prod-
uct dierentiation in short-run. However, Fujiwara (2009) sidesteps the issue of pollution
of abatement by rms. In addition, it does not recognise the role of strategic managerial
delegation and mode of product market competition.
In contrast to Fujiwara (2009), we nd that (positive) optimal emission tax rate can be
lower for more dierentiated products, irrespective of mode of product market competition
and the managerial incentive scheme oered by rms. The underlying intuition is as follows.
2For example, sequential entry (Church and Ware, 1996), mixed oligopoly (White, 2001), mergers
(Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001; Ziss, 2001), wage bargaining (Szymanski, 1994), trade policy
(Das, 1997), investment in R&D (Lambertini and Primavera, 2001; Zhang and Zhang, 1997; Kopel and
Riegler, 2006; Krakel, 2004), to name a few.
4Higher degree of product dierentiation leads to increase in production and, hence, higher
taxes are required to control resulting increase in pollution. However, higher emission tax
rate induces rms to invest more to abate pollution. The increased abatement cost, due
to higher emission tax rate, adversely aects social welfare. Therefore, it is not always
optimal for the government to impose higher emission tax rate in more dierentiated
products' industry.
Considering a linear incentive scheme based on prots and sales, as in Fershtman and
Judd (1987), this paper shows that, under quantity (price) competition, optimal emission
tax rate, outputs, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of
strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation. It demonstrates that
eects of strategic managerial delegation on emission tax rate, environmental damage and
social welfare crucially depend on the mode of product market competition. It also implies
that the results of Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) go through in case of dierentiated
product quantity competition, but does not hold in case of price competition.
In case of strategic managerial delegation, emission tax rate aects the output directly
as well as through its impact on managerial incentive scheme. The direct eect is always
negative, irrespective of the mode of product market competition and managerial dele-
gation. On the other hand, increase in emission tax rate makes the managerial incentive
scheme more prot oriented under quantity competition, but it reduces the penalty for sales
maximization under price competition. As a result, under quantity (price) competition,
the possibility of positive emission tax rate is more (less) in case of strategic managerial
delegation than that in case of no delegation. This paper also shows that the scope for
optimal emission tax rate to be lower for more dierentiated products is higher in case of
strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation, since in case of strategic
managerial delegation increase in output and corresponding increase in pollution due to
increase in product dierentiation is less than that in case of no delegation. These are
additional insights.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic model.
It also presents the analysis corresponding to dierent scenarios and illustrates the results.
5Section 3 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy with an oligopolistic sector, consisting of two rms - rm
1 and rm 2, that produce a dierentiated good and a competitive numeraire sector.
Production technologies of rm 1 and rm 2 are identical and the associated marginal cost
of production is c. Firm 1 and rm 2 produce q1 and q2 units of outputs, respectively,
and are engaged either in Bertrand type price competition or in Cournot type quantity
competition in the product market. The mode of competition in the product market is
exogenously determined and is common knowledge.
Production of each unit of output generates one unit of pollutant.3 However, rms
can reduce the level of pollution by adopting pollution abatement technique(s). Following
Ulph (1996), we consider that rm i can reduce the emission level to (qi   ai) ( qi) by
incurring the abatement cost Ci =
a2
i
2 , i = 1;2. Clearly, other than price (or quantity), each
rm has an additional choice variable ai (i = 1;2), i.e., the level of pollution abatement.
In line with the existing literature, we consider that environmental damage (ED)
increases at an increasing rate due to increase in pollution generated by the industry:
ED = 1
2d(q1   a1 + q2   a2)2, where d (> 0) is the increment in marginal environmental
damage due to pollution, i.e., the strength of environmental damage due to pollution.4 It
is evident that environmental damage due to pollution reduces social welfare.
The government's aim is to maximize social welfare (SW) and we consider that emis-
sion tax is the only policy instrument available to the government to correct for market
distortions. Since rms do not take into account the social cost of pollution, government
imposes tax t per unit of pollution emission.5
3For simplicity, unlike Kennedy (1994), we do not distinguish between local and transboundary pollu-
tants.
4 Antelo and Loureiro (2009), Long and Soubeyran (2005), Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2002) and
Ulph (1996), to name a few, also consider similar environmental damage function.
5We note here that the government can also impose environmental standards on rms (see, for example,
6On the demand side of the market, we consider that the (consumption) utility function
of the representative consumer is U = q1 + q2   1
2(q2
1 + q2
2 + 2q1q2) + m, where m is
the quantity of the numeraire good, c + t < 1.6 The degree of product dierentiation is
measured by the parameter  (0 <  < 1), lower value of  denotes higher degree of product
dierentiation, i.e., lower degree of substitutability between products. This specication
of U(:) generates the following linear demand structure.7
qi =
1
1   2[1      pi + pj]; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (1)
Inverting (1), we get the following system of linear inverse demand functions.
pi = 1   qi   qj; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (2)











2.1 Emission tax in case of no delegation
We begin with the scenario in which owners of rms do not hire managers. In other words,
given the emission tax (t), owner of each rm simultaneously and independently decide the
prot maximizing quantity (or price) and the level of abatement. The stages of the game
involved are as follows.
Stage 1: The government decides the tax (subsidy) rate t to maximize social
welfare.
Barrett (1994), Ulph (1996), Andersen and Jensen (2005), Neary (2006), Withagen et al. (2007), Lahiri
and Ono (2007), to name a few.). However, to keep the analysis focused and simple, we consider tax as
the only policy instrument. Nonetheless, qualitative results of this analysis are likely to go through in
alternative policy environment(s).
6This specication of the representative consumer's utility function is similar to that of Singh and
Vives (1984).
7For simplicity, we assume that, unlike as in Zanchettin (2006), both rms sell positive outputs even
if prices are set at marginal cost.
7Stage 2: Owner of each rm simultaneously and independently decide the
quantity (or price) and the level of abatement in order to maximize
prot.
Quantity competition: We rst consider that rms are engaged in Cournot type quan-
tity competition in the product market. We solve the corresponding game by backward
induction method and summarize the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Under quantity competition, if owners of rms do not hire managers, the
equilibrium rate of emission tax, total tax collection, environmental damage, social welfare,
pollution abatement levels, outputs, prices and prots are, respectively,
tNDQ =
(1   c) ( 1 + 2d (3 + ))
1 +  + (2 + )




2 (4 + ) ( 1 + 2d (3 + ))

1 +  + (2 + )





2 d(4 + )
2

1 +  + (2 + )





2 (1 + 2d) (4 + )
1 +  + (2 + )
2 + 2d(3 + )
2;
aNDQ = a1;NDQ = a2;NDQ = tNDQ;
qNDQ = q1;NDQ = q2;NDQ =
(1   c) (1 + 2d) (3 + )
1 +  + (2 + )
2 + 2d(3 + )
2;
pNDQ = p1;NDQ = p2;NDQ =
2 +  + 4d (3 + ) + c (1 + 2d) (1 + ) (3 + )
1 +  + (2 + )
2 + 2d(3 + )
2 ; and




11 + 4 + 2(2 + )
2 + 12d2 (3 + )




1 +  + (2 + )
2 + 2d(3 + )
2
2 ;
where the subscript NDQ denotes no delegation, i.e., pure prot maximization, under
quantity competition.
Note that emission tax rate aects social welfare through three channels: (a) higher
tax rate leads to lower outputs, and lower outputs leads to lower social welfare; (b) higher
tax rate leads to higher level of abatements and higher total abatement cost, which ad-
versely aects social welfare; and (c) higher tax rate leads to lower emission and thus lower
8environmental damage, which enhances social welfare. Therefore, whether it is optimum
to impose positive tax on emission or not that depends on relative magnitudes of these
eects.
It is straight forward to observe that the equilibrium emission tax rate (tNDQ) is positive
(negative), if d > (<) 1
6+2 = dNDQ, say. That is, if the increment in marginal environmen-
tal damage due to pollution is more than a critical level, it is optimum to impose positive
tax on emission. In other words, if the government's concern about environmental damage
is beyond a certain level, positive emission taxes are optimal. This result is in line with
the existing literature on environmental tax in case of oligopolistic market structure.
Now, note that higher degree of product dierentiation (i.e., lower value of ) leads to
higher production in each rm (
@qi;NDQ
@ < 0). It implies that, a decrease in  would lead to
(a) increase in output and (b) increase in environmental damage due to higher emission.
The rst eect enhances social welfare, whereas the second eect adversely aects social
welfare. Upon inspection we nd that, tNDQ is increasing (decreasing) in , if d < (>)
5+2
2(3+)2 =  dNDQ; dNDQ <  dNDQ. It implies that the (positive) optimal emission tax rate
need not necessarily be higher for more dierentiated products. If the rate of marginal
environmental damage due to pollution is relatively less, dNDQ < d <  dNDQ, the optimal
emission tax becomes lower as products are more dierentiated. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. As the degree of product dierentiation increases, production increases
and hence higher taxes are required to control resulting increase in pollution. However,
higher tax rate leads to higher level of abatement and hence the total cost of abatement
increases, which adversely aects social welfare. Note that, in equilibrium, the level of
abatement in each rm is equal to the emission tax rate, i.e., the rms abate pollution up
to the point where marginal abatement cost equals the tax. Therefore, unless the strength
of environmental damage (d) is suciently high, it is optimal to have lower emission tax for
more dierentiated products. This result is in contrast to the result of Fujiwara (2009),
where the role of pollution abatement technology is not recognised.8 It indicates that
8If we assume away pollution abatement by rms, the optimal tax rate under Cournot competition, in
no delegation case, is t =  1+c+2d 2cd
1+2d+ , which is positive for d > 1
2. Moreover, the optimal (positive) tax
9pollution abatement decisions of rms and associated costs have signicant bearing on
impact of product dierentiation on optimal emission tax rate.
Proposition 1: (a) Under quantity competition, in case of no delegation the optimal
emission tax rate is positive, if the increment in marginal environmental damage due to
pollution is greater than a critical level, d > dNDQ (= 1
6+2).
(b) In this case, the optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily increasing in degree of
product dierentiation. If dNDQ < d <  dNDQ (=
5+2
2(3+)2), the optimal emission tax becomes
lower as products are more dierentiated. Alternatively, if d >  dNDQ, in equilibrium, higher
degree of product dierentiation leads to higher emission tax rate.
Price competition: We now consider Bertrand type price competition in the product market
in stage 2 of the game. As before, we solve the game by backward induction method and
summarize the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: In case of price competition, if owners of rms do not hire managers, the
equilibrium rate of emission tax, total tax collection, environmental damage, social welfare,
pollution abatement levels, outputs, prices and prots are, respectively,




2 + 2d (3 + (1   ) )   1

2d(3 + (1   ) )





4 +    22  
2 + 2d (3 + (1   ) )   1


2d(3 + (1   ) )






4 +    222

2d(3 + (1   ) )




2 (1 + 2d)
 
4 +    22
2d(3 + (1   ) )
2 + (1 + ) (5   (3   ) 2)
;
aNDP = a1;NDP = a2;NDP = tNDP;
qNDP = q1;NDP = q2;NDP =
(1   c) (1 + 2d) (3 + (1   ) )
2d(3 + (1   ) )
2 + (1 + ) (5   (3   ) 2)
;
pNDP = p1;NDP = p2;NDP =
1 + c + tNDP   
2   
; and
NDP = 1;NDP = 2;NDP =
2(1   c)
2   4 (1   c) tNDP + 6t2
NDP   2(1   c   tNDP)
2    3t2
NDP 2 + t2
NDP 3
2(2   )
2 (1 + )
;
where the subscript NDP denotes no delegation, i.e., pure prot maximization, under price
competition.
As in case of quantity competition, under no delegation, optimal emission tax rate
in case of price competition is positive (negative), if the rate of marginal environmental
damage due to pollution is more than a critical level. However, since the intensity of
competition in case of price competition is dierent from that in case of quantity com-
petition, the critical levels of rate of marginal environmental damage beyond which the
optimal emission tax rate is positive are likely to be dierent under alternative modes of
product market competition. Upon inspection we nd that, in case of price competition
without delegation, the optimal emission tax rate is positive, if d >
1 2
2(3+ 2) = dNDP,
say. It is easy to check that, dNDP < dNDQ. That is, the optimal emission tax rate in
case of price competition is positive for lower rate of marginal environmental damage due
to pollution compared to that in case of quantity competition. In other words, in case of
pure prot maximization, the scope for positive emission tax rate is higher under price
competition than that under quantity competition. The intuition behind this result is a
switch from quantity competition to price competition leads to higher outputs as well as
11higher environmental damage through expansion in pollution. To tackle the resulting pol-
lution expansion, optimal emission tax rate becomes positive for relatively less increment
in marginal environmental damage due to pollution in case of price competition than that
in case of quantity competition.
It is easy to check that
@tPND
@ > 0 if (a) 1
2   < 1 or (b)  < 1
2 and d <
(1+)2 (5 2 (3 (3 )))
2(1 2)(3+(1 ))2 =
 dNDP. Clearly, in case of price competition with no delegation, if   1
2, the (positive)
emission tax rate is lower for higher degree of product dierentiation. Otherwise, if  < 1
2,
the (positive) emission tax rate is lower for more dierentiated products provided that
dNDP < d <  dNDP holds. Therefore, in case of price competition, the impact of prod-
uct dierentiation on optimal tax rate is dependent on d, only if the degree of product
dierentiation is high ( < 1
2). We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In case of price competition with no delegation,
(a) the optimal emission tax rate is positive, if the increment in marginal environmental
damage due to pollution is more than a certain level, dPND =
1 2
2(3+ 2); and
(b) the optimal emission tax rate is more for lower degree of product dierentiation, if (i)
  1
2 or (ii)  < 1
2 and dNDP < d <  dNDP, where  dNDP =
(1+)2 (5 2 (3 (3 )))
2(1 2)(3+(1 ))2 .
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under alternative modes of product market com-
petition in case of no delegation, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we nd that emission tax
rate, environmental damage, outputs and social welfare are higher under price competi-
tion than that under quantity competition. The equilibrium prots are lower, and total
tax collection (when the optimal tax is positive under both quantity and price competi-
tion) is higher under price competition than that under quantity competition. Clearly, a
switch from quantity competition to price competition increases outputs and thus consumer
surplus, which overcompensates for the loss due to associated increase in environmental
damage and decrease in prots, resulting higher social welfare.
122.2 Emission tax in case of strategic managerial delegation
Now, we consider that owners of both rms hire managers and delegate them to take
decisions concerning output, as in Fershtman and Judd (1987). Owners know that man-
agers are risk-neutral and they will engage either in Cournot type quantity competition
or in Bertrand type price competition, in the product market. Thus, given the incen-
tive structure, which is a linear combination of prots and sales, managers will maximize
Oi = ii + (1   i)piqi, i = 1;2, where i is the prot of rm i and i is the incentive
parameter set by rm i. Therefore, the stages of the game are as following.
Stage 1: The government decides the emission tax rate to maximize social
welfare.
Stage 2: Owner of each rm simultaneously and independently decides the
incentive parameter so that the prot is maximized.
Stage 3: Each manager chooses the level of output (or price) and abatement
level, simultaneously and independently, to maximize the incentive
scheme, given the incentive parameter.
We solve this game, considering quantity competition and price competition in the
product market separately, by backward induction method.
Quantity competition: In case of quantity competition in the product market, given the
emission tax rate and incentive parameters, the optimum choice of outputs and abatement
levels of the managers in stage 3 are, respectively, qi =
2  (c+t)(2i  j)
4 2 and ai = t,
i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. It implies that increase in the emission tax rate leads to less aggressive
behaviour of managers. On the other hand, when 0 < c + t < 1, if owner of rm i reduces
i, manager of rm i become more aggressive, but its rival's output decreases. But, if there
is subsidy for emission (t < 0) and the rate of subsidy is more than c (c + t < 0), decrease
in i makes the manager of rm i less aggressive. Moreover, note that in case of strategic
managerial delegation also the level of abatement is chosen at a point where the marginal
abatement cost is equal to the emission tax rate.
13Given the emission tax rate, the equilibrium incentive parameters chosen by owners in
stage 2 are 1 = 2 = 1  
(1 c t)2
(c+t)(4+2 2). Clearly, when 0 < c + t < 1, the equilibrium
incentive parameters are less than one. That is, in equilibrium, owners decide to make
their managers to be more aggressive in the product market. However, in case of emission
subsidy, owners may nd it optimal to make their managers less aggressive: i > 1, if




(c+t)2 (4+2 2) > 0, i = 1;2. That is, higher emission tax rate
leads to higher incentive parameters and thus to less aggressive behaviour of managers in
the product market.
We now summarize the equilibrium outcomes of the game in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: In case of quantity competition with strategic managerial delegation, the
equilibrium rate of emission tax, total tax collection, environmental damage, social welfare,
incentive parameters, pollution abatement levels, outputs, prices and prots are, respec-
tively,
tDQ =
2 (1   c)
 
 2 + 2 + d (12 + 2 (2   ) )

4 (1 + ) + 2d(6 + (2   ) )





4 +    2  
 2 + 2 + d (12 + 2 (2   ) )


4 (1 + ) + 2d(6 + (2   ) )







4 +    22

4 (1 + ) + 2d(6 + (2   ) )





2 (1 + 2d)
 
4 +    2
4 (1 + ) + 2d(6 + (2   ) )
2 + (4 + (2   ) )
2;
DQ = 1;DQ = 2;DQ = 1  
(1   c   tDQ) 2
(c + tDQ) (4 + 2   2)
;
aDQ = a1;DQ = a2;DQ = tDQ;
qDQ = q1;DQ = q2;DQ =
2 (1   c) (1 + 2d) (6 + (2   ) )
4 (1 + ) + 2d(6 + (2   ) )
2 + (4 + (2   ) )
2;
pDQ = p1;DQ = p2;DQ =
2 (1 + c + tDQ) + 2 (c + tDQ)    2
4 + (2   ) 
; and
DQ = 1;DQ = 2;DQ =
 
2   2
f4 + 4c2   8c (1   tDQ)   8tDQg + t2
DQ [24 +  f16    (8 + (4   ) )g]
2(4 + (2   ) )
2 ;
14where the subscript DQ denotes strategic managerial delegation under quantity competi-
tion.
It is straightforward to check that the optimum emission tax rate (tDQ) is positive
(negative), if d > (<)
2 2
2(6+2 2) = dDQ, say. That is, it is optimal to impose positive
emission tax rate in case of strategic managerial delegation under quantity competition, if
the increment in marginal environmental damage due to pollution is more than a critical
level. Also, note that dDQ < dNDQ. That is, in case of strategic managerial delegation
under quantity competition the possibility of optimum emission tax rate to be positive is
more than that in case of no managerial delegation.
Also, the equilibrium incentive parameter is greater than one, if d < dDQ and 0 < c <
4 22 4d(6+2 2)
(1+2d)(4+2 2)(6+2 2). That is, if there is subsidy on emission and the marginal cost of
production is less than a critical level, it is optimum for owners to make the managers less
aggressive in the product market. However, such possibility does not arise, if d > dDQ.
Now, note that
@tDQ
@ > 0, if d <
20+ (2+)(6 (2 )2 )
2(1 )(6+2 2)
2 =  dDQ. That is, the optimal
emission tax rate is lower (higher) for more (less) dierentiated products, if the increment
in marginal environmental damage is less than certain level ( dDQ), in case of strategic
managerial delegation under quantity competition. The underlying intuition is similar to
that in case of no delegation. However, note that  dDQ >  dNDQ. It implies that under
quantity competition the scope for the optimal emission tax rate to be lower (higher) for
more (less) dierentiated products is greater in case of strategic managerial delegation than
that in case of no delegation. Because, in case of strategic managerial delegation, increase in
output and associated increase in pollution level due to increase in product dierentiation




@ ). It also implies that the rate
of change in emission tax rate due to change in product dierentiation is higher in case of





Proposition 3: (i) In case of strategic managerial delegation under quantity compe-
tition,
(a) the optimal emission tax rate is positive, if the increment in marginal environmental
damage due to pollution is higher than the critical level dDQ (=
2 2
2(6+2 2)); and
15(b) the optimal emission tax rate is more for lower degree of product dierentiation, if




(ii) Under quantity competition, (a) the scope for the optimal emis-
sion tax rate to be lower (higher) for more (less) dierentiated products and (b) the possi-
bility of optimum emission tax rate to be positive are higher in case of strategic managerial
delegation than that in case of no delegation.
Now, we turn to compare the equilibrium outcomes, under quantity competition, in
case of strategic managerial delegation with that in case of no delegation.9 It is easy
to check that if emission tax is positive, the equilibrium incentive parameter in case of
strategic managerial delegation, under quantity competition, is less than one, DQ < 1,
which induces the managers to be more aggressive in the product market and produce more
outputs than that in case of no delegation. This in turn invites higher emission tax rate
in case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation: tDQ > tNDQ.
However, it turns out that the positive eect of incentive scheme outweighs the negative
eect of increased emission tax rate on outputs and thus the equilibrium outputs are higher
in case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation (qDQ > qNDQ).
Therefore, in equilibrium, under quantity competition consumer surplus and total tax
collection are higher, but prots are lower, in case of strategic managerial delegation than
that in case of no delegation. Also, it is easy to check that qDQ   qNDQ > tDQ   tNDQ,
which indicates that the marginal environmental damage due to pollution under quantity
competition is higher in case of strategic managerial delegation compared to that in case of
no delegation. Thus, under quantity competition the equilibrium environmental damage
in case of strategic managerial delegation is more than that in case of no delegation. Upon
inspection we nd that, greater consumer surplus and total tax collection together over
9Note that, if t < 0, we would have a1 = a2 = 0, i = (pi   c)qi   tqi, ED = 1
2d(q1 + q2)2 and
SW = U   c(q1 + q2)   ED , respectively. Clearly, the optimal prots, environmental damage and social
welfare in case of subsidy would be dierent from that in case of (positive) tax. However, the optimal
outputs, prices, and incentive parameters will remain the same.
16compensate for higher environmental damage and lower prots. Therefore, social welfare
under quantity competition is higher in case of strategic delegation than that in case of no
delegation.
Proposition 4: In case of strategic managerial delegation, under quantity competition,
the equilibrium prots of rms are lower, but emission tax rate, outputs of rms, total tax
collection, environmental damage and social welfare are higher than that in case of no
delegation.
Price competition: We now turn to analyse the case of strategic managerial delegation
under price competition. In this case, in stage 3 of the game the manager of rm i sets the
price pi =
(2  2)+(c+t)(21+ 2)
4 2 and pollution abatement level ai = t, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
It implies that increase in emission tax rate leads to increase in prices as well as levels
of abatement set by managers. It implies that increase in emission tax rate induces the
managers to be less aggressive in the product market. Moreover, when c+t > 0 (c+t < 0),
if owner of rm i reduces i, manager of rm i becomes more (less) aggressive, as in case
of quantity competition.
However, given the emission tax rate, the equilibrium incentive parameters chosen by
owners in stage 2 are 1 = 2 = 1 +
(1 c t)(1 )2
(c+t)(4 2 2). That is, when 1 > c + t > 0, under
price competition owners choose the incentive parameter to be greater than one, i > 1,
which restricts the managers' aggressiveness in the product market. Alternatively, if there
is subsidy on emission and c+t < 0, the optimal incentive parameter is less than one, which








0. That is, the optimal incentive parameter is decreasing in emission tax rate. Clearly,
these results are opposite to that under quantity competition. Lemma 4 summarizes the
equilibrium outcomes of the game under price competition.
Lemma 4: In case of strategic managerial delegation under price competition, the
equilibrium rate of emission tax, total tax collection, environmental damage, social welfare,
incentive parameters, pollution abatement levels, outputs, prices and prots are, respec-
17tively,
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)))







(8 +  (2    (6 + )))
 
 1 + 2 + d (6 +  (2    (4 + 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2 (1 + 2d)
 
2   2
(8 +  (2    (6 + )))
(1 + ) (20   242 + 64 + 5) + 2d(6 +  (2    (4 + )))
2;
DP = 1;DP = 2;DP =
(1   ) 2 + c (2   )
 
2   2
  tDP (2   )
 
2   2
(c + tDP) (4    (2 + ))
;
aDP = a1;DP = a2;DP = tDP;
qDP = q1;DP = q2;DP =
(1   c) (1 + 2d)
 
2   2
(6 +  (2    (4 + )))
(1 + ) (20   242 + 64 + 5) + 2d(6 +  (2    (4 + )))
2;
pDP = p1;DP = p2;DP =
2 (1 + c + tDP)   2   (c + tDP) 2
4    (2 + )
; and
DP = 1;DP = 2;DP =
1




(4 + 4c2   8c (1   tDP)   8tDP )
+ t2
DP (24 +  ( 8 +  ( 24 +  (1 + ) (4 + ))))];
where the subscript DP denotes strategic managerial delegation under price competition.
Note that, tDP > 0 , d >
1 2
6+ (2 4 2) = dDP. That is, the optimal emission tax rate
is positive in case of strategic managerial delegation under price competition, if the rate of
marginal environmental damage due to pollution is greater than dDP. It is easy to check
that dDP > dNDP. It implies that, unlike as under quantity competition, the possibility of
optimal emission tax rate under price competition to be positive is less in case of strategic
managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation.
Also, note that the equilibrium incentive parameter under price competition is not nec-




Finally, we observe that
@tDP




2 (4 4 42+4) =  dDP. Therefore, in case of price
competition with strategic managerial delegation, if   0:636203 the (positive) emission
tax rate is lower for higher degree of product dierentiation. Otherwise, if  < 0:636203,
18the (positive) emission tax rate is lower for more dierentiated products provided that
dDP < d <  dDP holds. It is easy to check that  dDP <  dNDP ( dDP >  dNDP), if  > 0:636203
( < 0:636203). Comparing it with Proposition 2, it is evident that under price competition
the possibility of the (positive) emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product
dierentiation is less (more) in case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of
no delegation, if the degree of product dierentiation () is greater (less) than 1
2.
Proposition 5: (i) In case of price competition with strategic managerial delegation,
(a) the optimal emission tax rate is positive, if the increment in marginal environmental
damage due to pollution is greater than dDP (=
1 2
6+ (2 4 2) > dNDP); and
(b) the optimal emission tax rate is more for lower degree of product dierentiation, if (1)
  0:636203 or (2)  < 0:636203 and d <  dDP,




(ii) In case of price competition with strategic managerial delegation
the possibility of optimal emission tax rate to be positive is less than that in case of price
competition without delegation. Moreover, under price competition, the possibility of the
optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product dierentiation is less in
case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation, unless the degree
of product dierentiation is less than 1
2.
From Proposition 3 and 5, it is evident that strategic managerial delegation aects
the critical amount of increment in marginal environmental damage due to pollution, for
optimal emission tax rate to be positive, in opposite directions under alternative modes of
product market competition. Impacts of strategic managerial delegation on the scope for
the optimal emission tax rate to be lower for higher degree of product dierentiation under
alternative modes of product market competition are also quite dierent.
Now, comparing Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, we nd that the optimal emission tax rate,
under price competition, in case of strategic managerial delegation is less than that in case
19of no delegation: tDP < tNDP. This is in sharp contrast to that under quantity competition.
The reason is, under price competition with strategic managerial delegation, when the
optimal emission tax rate is positive, the equilibrium incentive parameter is greater than
one (DP > 1), which induces the managers to be less aggressive in the product market than
that in case of no delegation and thus invites lower emission tax rate. Note that, ceteris
paribus, outputs are decreasing in emission tax rate. However, under price competition, the
optimal incentive scheme reduces the outputs of rms by more than the amount of increase
in outputs due to lower taxes in case of strategic managerial delegation from that in case of
no delegation. Therefore, in equilibrium, outputs are lower in case of price competition with
strategic managerial delegation than that in case of price competition without delegation.
This in turn leads to lower consumer surplus and lower total tax collection and higher prots
in case of strategic managerial delegation compared to that in case of no delegation, under
price competition. Now, it is easy to check that qDP  qNDP < tDP  tNDP. It implies that
the marginal environmental damage due to pollution, under price competition, is lower in
case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation. Therefore, under
price competition, in equilibrium, environmental damage in case of strategic managerial
delegation is less than that in case of no delegation. Finally, we nd that social welfare
in case of price competition with strategic managerial delegation is less than that in case
of price competition with no delegation, since the combined loss due to lower consumer
surplus and lower total tax collection dominates the total gain due to higher prots and
lower environmental damage due to pollution.
Proposition 6: In case of strategic managerial delegation, under price competition,
the equilibrium prots of rms are higher, but emission tax rate, outputs of rms, total
tax collection, environmental damage and social welfare are lower than that in case of no
delegation.
The above proposition is in sharp contrast to Proposition 4. That is, the impact
of strategic managerial delegation on optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage
20and social welfare are in opposite directions under alternative modes of product market
competition, quantity and price. Nonetheless, comparing Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we
nd that the equilibrium emission tax rate, environmental damage, and social welfare
are higher under price competition than that under quantity competition even in case of
strategic managerial delegation.
3 Conclusion
This paper analyses the impacts of product dierentiation, strategic managerial delega-
tion and mode of product market competition, as well as of their interactions, on optimal
emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare. The analysis of this paper
helps to understand the underlying mechanism to design emission tax scheme in a broader
framework. This paper clearly demonstrates that mode of product market competition,
incentive schemes within rms, degree of product dierentiation and strength of environ-
mental damage due to pollution as well as pollution abatement cost play vital roles in
determining the appropriate environmental policy scheme.
It shows that, in contrast to Fujiwara (2009), (positive) optimal emission tax rate can
be lower for more dierentiated products under plausible parametric congurations. It also
shows that under quantity (price) competition, the possibility of positive emission tax rate
is more (less) in case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation;
and the scope for optimal emission tax rate to be lower for more dierentiated products
is higher in case of strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation.
Moreover, this paper shows that under quantity (price) competition, optimal emission
tax rate, outputs, environmental damage and social welfare are higher (lower) in case of
strategic managerial delegation than that in case of no delegation.
Note that this paper considers a linear combination of prot and sales revenue as the
managerial incentive scheme. This particular incentive scheme is widely used in the lit-
erature. Nonetheless, in reality the managerial incentive scheme can be of dierent forms
as well, such as a linear combination of rm's own prot and its rival's prot (Miller and
21Pazgal, 2001), weighted sum of prots and market share (Jansen et al., 2007), etc. It
is straightforward, but tedious, to check that the qualitative results of this paper remain
valid under alternative incentive schemes as well. To illustrate it further, note that, if
owners design incentive schemes based on a linear combination of its own prot and its
rival's prot, price and quantity competition leads to same equilibrium outputs in case of
strategic managerial delegation (Miller and Pazgal, 2001), which lie in between the equilib-
rium outcomes in case of no delegation under price competition and quantity competition.
Clearly, given the mode of product market competition, the direction of change in equi-
librium outputs due to a switch from no delegation to strategic managerial delegation is
not sensitive to the type of managerial incentive scheme. It indicates that, the qualitative
results of this paper seems to be robust to the form of managerial incentive scheme.
In this paper, we have considered closed economies. In case of open economies, strategic
behaviour of governments in designing environmental policies to control local and global
pollution ads additional dimensions. It seems to be interesting to extend the present
analysis by considering open economies and strategic behaviour of governments.
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